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26, which addresses reasonable suspicion. The State specifically cites the Court to
paragraphs 16-26 of the opinion in support of its argument that reasonable suspicion
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Supreme Court of Utah.
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Petitioner
v.
David Roger MARKLAND, Defendant and
Respondent.
No. 20040190.
April 15, 2005.
Third District, Salt Lake; The Honorable William
Barrett.
Mark L. Shurtleff, Att'y Gen., Jeffrey S. Gray,
Asst. Att'y Gen., Michaela Andruzzi, Salt Lake
City, for plaintiff.
Linda M. Jones, Nisa J. Sisneros, Salt Lake City,
for defendant.
On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals
DURRANT, Justice:
*1 H 1 In this case, we must determine whether
David Roger Markland's constitutional right to be
free from unreasonable searches and seizures was
violated when a police officer detained him in order
to run a five-minute warrants check. At issue is
whether Markland's detention was justified by a
reasonable suspicion that Markland had engaged,
was engaged, or was about to engage in criminal
activity. The district court concluded that
Markland's detention was justified. However, in a
2-1 opinion, the Utah Court of Appeals reversed,
holding that the detention was unlawful because the
facts in the record did not support the conclusion
that the detaining officer possessed the requisite
degree of suspicion prior to initiating the detention.
We granted certiorari to review the court of appeals'
decision. We now reverse.
BACKGROUND
H 2 At 3:14 a.m., Deputy Edward Spotten received
a call from dispatch informing him that someone

was "screaming or crying out for help" near the
eastern end of the Bridgeside Landing apartment
complex. Deputy Spotten arrived at the apartment
complex within five minutes after hearing the
report. Upon his arrival, Deputy Spotten proceeded
to drive down a dead end street located on the east
side of the complex. At that time, he observed
Markland walking toward the dead end of the poorly
lit street. Markland was carrying two over-theshoulder cloth bags and was the only individual
Deputy Spotten noticed in the area.
H 3 Deputy Spotten pulled his patrol car alongside
Markland, exited the vehicle and, after informing
Markland that there had been a report of screaming
in the area, asked whether Markland had heard
anything. Markland responded in the negative.
Deputy Spotten then asked Markland where he was
headed. Markland replied that he was walking
home, which he stated was approximately twenty
blocks away. Aware that the street on which
Markland was traveling reached only a dead end,
Deputy Spotten reasoned that Markland's present
course would not lead him home.
% 4 At that point, Deputy Spotten asked Markland
for some identification and proceeded to run a brief
warrants check. That check revealed an outstanding
warrant for Markland's arrest. Deputy Spotten
therefore arrested Markland and, in a search
incident to that
arrest,
discovered
drug
paraphernalia, methamphetamine, and marijuana.
K 5 The State charged Markland with two counts of
unlawful possession of a controlled substance.
Markland, arguing that his detention during the
warrants check was unlawful, moved to suppress the
drugs discovered after his arrest. After a hearing,
the district court denied the motion to suppress, and
Markland appealed.
K 6 In a 2-1 decision, the court of appeals reversed
the district court's ruling and held that Deputy
Spotten's detention of Markland for the purpose of
running a warrants check was not supported by a
reasonable suspicion that Markland was connected
to criminal activity. State v. Markland, 2004 UT
App 1, K 9, 84 P-3d 240. The State petitioned this
court for a writ of certiorari, which we granted. We
have jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code section
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
*2 % 7 "On certiorari, we review the decision of the
court of appeals and not that of the district court."
State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, H 11, 103 P.3d 699.
Our review is for correctness, and we grant no
deference to the court of appeals' opinion. Grand
County v. Rogers, 2002 UT 25, U 6, 44 P.3d 734.
As an essential component of this correctness
review, we must determine whether the court of
appeals applied the proper standard of review when
considering the district court's ruling. Brake, 2004
UT94at1J 11.
H 8 In the present case, the court of appeals
reviewed the district court's ruling for correctness,
but it conducted that review "with a measure of
discretion given to the trial judge's application of the
legal standard to the facts." State v. Markland, 2004
UT App 1, H 2, 84 P.3d 240 (internal quotation
omitted). Subsequent to the court of appeals'
decision in Markland, we released our opinion in
Brake, which resolved apparent confusion as to the
appropriate standard of review in the search and
seizure context and expressly adopted nondeferential review in such cases. Brake, 2004 UT 95
at K 15 ("We abandon the standard which extended
'some deference' to the application of law to the
underlying factual findings in search and seizure
cases in favor of non-deferential review.").
K 9 As Brake makes clear, the court of appeals
improperly granted deference to the district court's
application of the law to the facts. Consequently,
when undertaking our own review, we apply the
proper, non-deferential standard.
ANALYSIS
TJ 10 The Fourth Amendment's protections against
unreasonable searches and seizures "extend to brief
investigatory stops of persons or vehicles that fall
short of traditional arrest." United States v. Arvizu,
534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002). However, it is settled
law that "a police officer may detain and question an
individual when the officer has reasonable,
articulable suspicion that the person has been, is, or
is about to be engaged in criminal activity." State v.
Chapman, 921 P.2d 446, 450 (Utah 1995) (internal
quotation omitted). [FN1] In order to justify such a
detention, the officer's suspicion must be supported
by "specific and articulable facts and rational
© 2005 Thomson/West. No

inferences," United States v. Werking, 915 F.2d
1404, 1407 (10th Cir.1990), and cannot be merely
an "inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or
'hunch,' " Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968).
However, "[a] determination that reasonable
suspicion exists ... need not rule out the possibility
of innocent conduct." Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 277.
Indeed, "the likelihood of criminal activity need not
rise to the level required for probable cause, and it
falls
considerably
short
of
satisfying
a
preponderance of the evidence standard." Id. at 274.
FN1. Our case law has identified three permissible
levels of police stops:
(1) An officer may approach a citizen at any time
and pose questions so long as the citizen is not
detained against his will; (2) an officer may seize a
person if the officer has an articulable suspicion
that the person has committed or is about to
commit a crime ...; (3) an officer may arrest a
suspect if the officer has probable cause to believe
an offense had been committed or is being
committed.
State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761, 763 (Utah 1991)
(internal quotation and quotation marks omitted).
In the present case, the parties agree that a leveltwo stop commenced when Deputy Spotten
requested Markland's identification for the purpose
of conducting a warrants check.
K 11 When reviewing a given factual situation to
determine if reasonable suspicion justified a
detention, "[cjourts must view the articulable facts
in their totality and avoid the temptation to divide
the facts and evaluate them in isolation." State v.
Warren, 2003 UT 36, fl 14, 78 P.3d 590. Courts
must also "judge the officer's conduct in light of
common sense and ordinary human experience and
... accord deference to an officer's ability to
distinguish between innocent and suspicious
actions." United States v. Williams, 111 F.3d 1262,
1268 (10th Cir.2001) (internal quotation and
citations omitted); accord Warren, 2003 UT 36 at ffif
20-21 (stating that courts should consider officers'
subjective assessment of the facts).
*3 \ 12 The parties to this appeal do not dispute the
articulation of the law outlined above, nor do they
dispute the relevant facts. Rather, they dispute
whether the facts observed by Deputy Spotten gave
rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion that
criminal activity was afoot and that Markland was
connected to that activity.
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U 13 The district court concluded that Deputy
Spotten did have a reasonable, articulable suspicion
and, in support of that conclusion, found the
following facts:
a) [Deputy Spotten] received a report that someone
was crying for help five minutes earlier in the area
where he found [Markland].
b) It was late at night and the area was not well lit.
c) [Markland] was headed down a dead-end road
where he could not get anywhere.
d) [Markland] said he was going home to a
location that he could not get to by traveling in the
direction in which he was headed.
e) [Markland] was carrying two bags with him.
K 14 The court of appeals reversed the district
court's ruling, stating that the facts, as found by the
district court, were not constitutionally sufficient to
justify Markland's detention because "Deputy
Spotten did not testify that he had any suspicions of
criminal activity concerning [Markland]." State v.
Markland, 2004 UT App 1, K 7, 84 P.3d 240.
According to the court of appeals, "the officers
responded to a suspicious circumstances call, yet
they did not observe, have knowledge of, or have
suspicions about any crime that had been committed
or was about to be committed, let alone any crime
[Markland] had committed or was about to commit."
Id. at % 8. The court of appeals further noted that the
facts observed by Deputy Spotten "were at least as
consistent with lawful behavior as with the
commission of a crime." Id. at % 1 (internal
quotation omitted).
K 15 The State argues that the court of appeals
misapplied previous case law in concluding that the
detention was unconstitutional. Markland disagrees,
contending that the court of appeals conducted the
appropriate analysis. Markland further argues that,
even if we conclude that reasonable suspicion did
justify his detention, we can nevertheless affirm the
court of appeals by holding that the warrants check
exceeded the permissible scope of the detention. We
will analyze each contention in turn.
I. MARKLAND'S DETENTION WAS JUSTIFIED
BY REASONABLE SUSPICION
U 16 Although we consider this a close case, we
conclude that Deputy Spotten's detention of
Markland was justified by a reasonable, articulable
suspicion that crime was afoot and that Markland
was connected to that crime. The court of appeals,

in reaching the opposite conclusion, unduly
emphasized the possibility of an innocent
explanation of the facts Deputy Spotten witnessed,
and followed an overly formalistic approach to the
type of testimony that an officer must supply in
detention cases.
U 17 As to the first point, it is settled law that an
officer is not obligated to rule out innocent conduct
prior to initiating an investigatory detention. United
States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277 (2002); Illinois
v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000). This is
because the public interest in investigating criminal
activity is sufficiently important to justify the
minimal intrusion into personal security that such
investigatory detentions entail. Arvizu, 534 U.S. at
273.
*4 U 18 In its opinion, the court of appeals stated
that " 'the facts known to the officers regarding [the
defendant] were at least as consistent with lawful
behavior as with the commission of a crime .' "
State v. Markland, 2004 UT App 1, H 7, 84 P.3d
240 (quoting Salt Lake City v. Ray, 2000 UT App
55, U 19, 998 P.2d 274). This language improperly
imposes something akin to a preponderance of the
evidence standard that officers must satisfy before
initiating an investigatory detention. The United
States Supreme Court has made it clear that such a
standard is inappropriate in the investigatory
detention context. See Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274
("[T]he likelihood of criminal activity need not rise
to the level required for probable cause, and it falls
considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of
the evidence standard."). As a result, the court of
appeals placed an improperly elevated burden on the
State. That elevated burden, in turn, contributed to
the court's incorrect conclusion that Markland's
detention was unconstitutional.
TJ 19 Additionally, the court of appeals put too great
an emphasis on the fact that Deputy Spotten never
testified as to what crime he suspected had been
committed or how Markland was connected to that
crime. In a sense, the court of appeals faults Deputy
Spotten for not connecting his own testimonial dots.
However, the Fourth Amendment does not demand
such rigid formalities. As long as the underlying
facts, and reasonable inferences drawn from those
facts, justify the conclusion that reasonable
suspicion existed at the inception of a level-two
stop, the Fourth Amendment is satisfied. See United
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States v. Werking, 915 F.2d 1404, 1407 (10th
Cir.1990) (stating that an investigatory detention "is
justified when specific and articulable facts and
rational inferences drawn from those facts give rise
to a reasonable suspicion" that crime is afoot
(emphasis added)); see also State v. Warren, 2003
UT 36, K 14, 78 P.3d 590 (stating that an officer
"must be able to point to specific facts which,
considered with rational inferences from those facts,
reasonably warrant the intrusion" (emphasis
added)). Although the connections that the court of
appeals deems necessary may be absent from
Deputy Spotten's express testimony,
those
connections can reasonably and rationally be
inferred from the totality of facts to which Deputy
Spotten testified.
11 20 Deputy Spotten's testimony established that he
arrived at the Bridgeside Landing apartment
complex just after 3:00 a.m., only a few minutes
after hearing a report that someone was "screaming
or crying out for help" in the area. Upon his arrival,
he observed only one individual, a man carrying two
over-the-shoulder cloth bags, who was walking
toward the dead end of a poorly lit street. At that
point, reason demanded that Deputy Spotten initiate
contact with the individual, the most apparent, and
perhaps only, lead in his investigation into the
unexplained screaming or crying for help.
*5 T| 21 As a result, he began to question the
individual, whose answers were inconsistent with
the observable facts. This further heightened Deputy
Spotten's suspicion of the already unusual nature of
the individual's presence behind the apartment
complex, far from his home, at so late an hour. In
furtherance of his investigation, Deputy Spotten
decided to momentarily detain the individual in
order to run checks that could potentially provide
information relevant to his investigation into the
cries for help, as well as information relevant to
Deputy Spotten's own safety, e.g., whether the
individual had a record indicating prior violent
behavior or a history of mental illness. We conclude
that, viewing the facts in their totality and
considering the rational inferences drawn from those
facts, Deputy Spotten's detention of Markland in
order to run a warrants check was justified at its
inception by a reasonable suspicion that crime was
afoot and that Markland was connected to that
crime.

% 22 In reaching the opposite conclusion below, the
court of appeals relied primarily upon two of its
previous decisions, Ray, 2000 UT App 55, and State
v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85 (Utah Ct.App. 1987).
However, both decisions are distinguishable from
the present case.
K 23 In Ray, officers detained a woman after
receiving a call from a convenience store owner
expressing concern that the woman in question had
been in front of the convenience store for
approximately two hours. 2000 UT App 55 atffi[2-3
. The store owner did not express any suspicion that
the woman was somehow connected to past, present,
or future criminal activity. Id. at K 2. The officers
questioned the woman, who stated that she was
waiting for a ride, and then asked for identification
in order to run a warrants check. Id. at H ^ 4-5. The
officers in Ray testified that they did not suspect the
woman of any criminal activity when they took her
identification in order to run a warrants check. Id. at
15.
K 24 In Trujillo, an officer detained three
individuals who had been "peering" into store
windows at approximately 3:30 a.m. 739 P.2d at 86.
The court of appeals concluded that the only facts
offered in support of the detention were the late
hour, the fact that the individuals appeared nervous
and were in a high-crime area, and the presence of a
"suspicious" knapsack. Id. at 86, 89. Although the
court concluded that the detention in that case was
not justified by reasonable suspicion, it twice
pointed out that the detaining officer had not
received any reports of criminal activity in the area
that day. Id.
K 25 The present case is quite different from both
Ray and Trujillo. Here, we are not dealing with a
situation, as in Ray, where an officer admitted that
he or she did not suspect criminal activity at the
inception of a challenged detention. That distinction
is fatal to any attempt to analogize Ray to the
present case. The analogy to Trujillo is also
imperfect because the officer in Trujillo lacked a
critical fact present in this case: a contemporaneous
report of suspicious circumstances in the area in
which Markland was detained. [FN2]
FN2. Markland argues that the cries for help could
have been precipitated by noncriminal activity.
That is certainly the case. However, the question is
not whether a noncriminal explanation for the cries
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might exist, but whether Deputy Spotten could
have reasonably suspected that criminal activity
was afoot considering his knowledge of the
reported cries for help and the additional
information obtained during his subsequent
investigation. The dissent argues that we should
ignore the dispatch report when analyzing whether
Deputy Spotten possessed reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity. According to the dissent, reliance
on the dispatch report is unwarranted because (1)
the appellate record contains no facts relating to the
reliability of the call precipitating the report, and
(2) Deputy Spotten was unable to uncover
information connecting Markland to the report. In
support of the first proposition, the dissent cites a
series of cases in which 911 calls or dispatch
reports provided the sole basis for effecting an
investigatory detention. In essence, the cases relied
upon by the dissent stand for the undisputed
principle that an investigatory detention cannot be
justified by an unreliable or unsubstantiated
dispatch report alone. However, in this case, the
dispatch report served a different function: it
justified the initiation of an investigation, not the
initiation of an investigatory detention. As to the
dissent's second proposition, we note that there
was a connection between Markland and the
dispatch call: Markland was the only individual
Deputy Spotten observed in the relatively secluded
area where the screams reportedly occurred, and
Deputy Spotten found him in that area at an odd
hour just five minutes after hearing the dispatch
report. Deputy Spotten should not have been
expected or required to completely ignore the
suspicious backdrop provided by the dispatch
report when investigating and evaluating the
additional suspicious circumstances attendant to
Markland's presence behind the apartment
complex. Such an integral aspect of the officer's
background knowledge cannot be excised from the
reasonable suspicion determination. That said, we
note that the dispatch report serves as only one of
the five factors that the district court relied upon
when upholding Markland's detention. Even in the
absence of an unassailable, inculpatory connection
between Markland and the dispatch report, we
conclude that the report was properly weighed as a
factor contributing to reasonable suspicion.
*6 TI 26 When viewed in their totality, the facts of
this case compel our conclusion that Deputy Spotten
possessed reasonable suspicion that crime was afoot
and that Markland, the sole individual he observed
in the area, was connected to that crime. Having so
concluded, we next address Markland's argument
that we can nevertheless affirm the court of appeals
by holding that the warrants check impermissibly

exceeded the permissible scope of his detention.
II. THE WARRANTS CHECK WAS WITHIN
THE PERMISSIBLE SCOPE OF MARKLAND'S
DETENTION
H 27 Markland contends that, under the
circumstances of his detention, running a warrants
check would not aid Deputy Spotten in either
confirming or alleviating his suspicion about
Markland's comiection to the reported cries for
help. He argues that the drugs uncovered after his
arrest should, therefore, be suppressed because they
were obtained as the result of a warrants check that
exceeded the permissible scope of his detention. We
disagree.
U 28 In upholding the constitutionality of a stopand-identify statute,
[FN3] the United States
Supreme Court recently granted implicit approval of
the use of warrants checks when undertaken as part
of a level-two detention, noting that "[k]nowledge of
identity may inform an officer that a suspect is
wanted for another offense, or has a record of
violence or mental disorder. On the other hand,
knowing identity may help clear a suspect and allow
the police to concentrate their efforts elsewhere."
Hiibelv. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 124 S.Ct. 2451,
2458 (2004). That pronouncement is not out of step
with prior case law. See, e.g., United States v.
Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229 (1985) (stating that the
ability to "check identification in the absence of
probable cause promotes the strong government
interest in solving crimes and bringing offenders to
justice"); United States v. Thompson, 282 F.3d 673,
679 (9th Cir.2002) (holding that, under the
circumstances,
a
warrants
check
taking
approximately twenty minutes did not exceed the
scope of an investigatory detention).
FN3. Stop-and-identify statutes are typically hybrid
statutes combining elements of vagrancy laws with
language aimed at regulating police conduct during
investigatory stops. See Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial
Dist. Court, 124 S.Ct. 2451, 2456 (2004).
K 29 Our own case law is similarly in accord with
the view that the warrants check conducted by
Deputy Spotten was within the permissible scope of
Maryland's detention. In State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d
1127, 1133 (Utah 1994), we explained that
implementing general Fourth Amendment principles
requires a balancing of the need to breach the wall
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of personal security with the extent of the particular
invasion. In that case, we noted that "the
government interest in arresting citizens who have
outstanding warrants is substantial." Id. We then
balanced that interest against the inconvenience
occasioned by a warrants check, stating that "the
impact of a warrants check on the scope of detention
is minimal because computerized data storage
renders the time for a records check negligible." Id.
(internal quotation omitted). Consequently, in
Lopez, we upheld the constitutionality of a warrants
check in the course of a routine traffic stop so long
as the check does not unreasonably extend the time
of detention. Id.
*7 K 30 Markland, without attempting to distinguish
the case law cited above, refers us to State v.
Chapman, 921 P.2d 446 (Utah 1995), which he
contends controls the outcome in this case. In
Chapman, an officer conducted checks on an
individual detained on suspicion of violating a
loitering ordinance and thereby discovered that the
individual was a gang member known to carry a
gun. Id. at 448. The officer obtained permission to
search the vehicle in which the gang member was
found, and discovered a gun stored in accordance
with Utah law. Id. The officer then ran a stolen
weapons check to determine whether the gun was
stolen. Id. We held that the stolen weapons check
was not properly related in scope to the
circumstances justifying the individual's detentionspecifically, suspicion of a loitering ordinance
violation. Id. at 453.
T| 31 Upholding the validity of the warrants check in
the present case is wholly consistent with Chapman.
In this case, Deputy Spotten did exactly what
Chapman allows, namely-take steps to further
investigate the suspected wrongdoing and protect
officer safety. In Chapman, we concluded that the
officer only strayed into unconstitutional territory
when he ran the stolen weapons check, an action
wholly unrelated to a suspected violation of a
loitering ordinance and conducted in the absence of
an articulable suspicion that the gun in question was
stolen. Id. at 454.
^J 32 In the present case, there was no such
overreaching by Deputy Spotten. The warrants
check was adequately related in scope to the reasons
justifying Markland's detention-specifically, Deputy
Spotten's suspicion that Markland was connected to

a crime relating to the reported screaming or crying
for help. As previously noted, when an officer is
conducting an initial investigation into criminal
activity, a warrants check can quickly provide
highly relevant information that serves to either
heighten or alleviate the suspicion that originally
justified the check. See State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d
761, 763-64 (Utah 1991) (quoting an officer's
testimony indicating that a warrants check is a
helpful investigative tool). Also, as noted above, a
warrants check can prove invaluable to officer
safety.
U 33 In this case, the warrants check could have
established that Markland had a history of violent
crime, simultaneously bolstering Deputy Spotten's
suspicion that Markland was connected to criminal
activity and alerting Deputy Spotten that he was
confronting a potentially violent individual.
Conversely, if Deputy Spotten had discovered that
Markland possessed no criminal background, his
level of suspicion may have decreased to a point at
which no further investigation into Markland's
potential connection to the cries for help would be
warranted.
TI 34 The warrants check itself lasted approximately
five minutes, a relatively minimal intrusion, and had
the potential to reveal information relevant to
Deputy Spotten's suspicion that Markland was
connected to the cries for help. We therefore hold
that the warrants check was within the permissible
scope of Markland's detention.
CONCLUSION
*8 U 35 We conclude that the totality of the facts,
combined with rational inferences drawn from those
facts, gave rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion
that Markland was connected to the reported cries
for help and, by rational inference, criminal activity.
As
a
result,
Markland's
detention
was
constitutionally justified. We also conclude that
Deputy Spotten acted within the permissible scope
of the detention when he conducted a warrants check
that had the potential to supply information relevant
to the investigation that gave rise to Markland's
detention. Given these conclusions, we reverse and
remand for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
T| 36 Associate Chief Justice WILKINS, Justice
PARRISH, and Justice NEHRING concur in Justice
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DURRANT's opinion.
DURHAM, Chief Justice, dissenting:
K 37 I respectfully dissent. This is indeed a close
case but I am simply not persuaded that the officers
had sufficient information to permit a lawful
warrants check. My concern is that the majority
opinion may be interpreted to mean that reasonable
suspicion may be based on an ambiguous telephone
report with no indicia of reliability and no
corroboration that there is even criminal activity
going on, let alone that the defendant is somehow
connected to it.
K 38 In most jurisdictions there appears to be no
presumption that a call to police, even if it is a 911
call, contributes to a police officer's reasonable
suspicion. Rather, either the call itself must be
highly reliable or the substance of the call must be
somehow corroborated. See, e.g., United States v.
Terry-Crespo, 356 F.3d 1170, 1173 (9th Cir.2004)
("Provided Mr. Domingis's 911 call exhibited
sufficient 'indicia of reliability,' it could have
provided Officer Kulp with reasonable suspicion
justifying a Terry stop."); United States v. Quarles,
330 F.3d 650, 656 (4th Cir.2003) ("[T]he 911 call
was not anonymous and provided sufficient
information about [the caller] and about the
defendant to find [the caller] credible and
knowledgeable. We also believe that the 911 call
provided sufficient reasonable suspicion to justify
stopping the defendant."); United States v. Nelson,
284 F.3d 472, 481 (3d Cir.2002) ( "[W]e assess
whether the [telephone] communications to the
police possessed sufficient indicia of reliability,
when considering the totality of the circumstances,
for us to conclude that the officers possessed an
objectively reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify
a Terry stop."); United States v. Jones, 242 F.3d
215, 218 (4th Cir.2001) (holding an anonymous 911
call that several black males were causing a
disturbance did not justify police stopping a car
containing black males).

K 39 In line with these cases, this court has also
analyzed dispatch calls to officers on patrol in order
to determine whether the calls were sufficiently
reliable to provide police with reasonable suspicion.
In State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994), for
example, we held that a dispatch call relaying
information obtained from a 7-Eleven store clerk,
who had reported a theft at the store and had
described the suspect and his car, including its
license plate number, did contain sufficient detailed
information to justify police in making an initial stop
of an individual matching the suspect's description.
Id. at 934, 940; see also State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d
646, 650-51 (Utah 1989) (holding that police who
received a radio bulletin were justified in stopping
the car identified in the bulletin as long as the
officers who had issued the bulletin originally
possessed sufficient articulable facts to constitute
reasonable suspicion).
*9 K 40 Here, the only information about the call in
the record is that the police received a report of the
call from dispatch. Thus, in this case, it would be
impossible to conduct the reliability analysis that is
often used to analyze whether police are justified in
relying on a call, either alone or in combination with
other factors, as a basis for reasonable suspicion.
Moreover, the police were unable to corroborate the
report of a scream or cry for help with other related
indications of criminal activity.
T| 41 Thus, based on the record before us, all we
have is an uncorroborated and, for all we know,
anonymous call, in combination with completely
unrelated "suspicious" behavior by someone who
was not even identified by the caller as the possible
perpetrator. An identity request for possible future
reference was, I believe, permissible, but the
warrants check was not based on reasonable
suspicion. I would affirm the court of appeals.
2005 WL 858159 (Utah), 2005 UT 26
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